For Imam Yahya, one of Yemen’s last kings, qat was a delight that he praised in poems. For his adversary, the revolutionary al-Zubayri, the plant was the “devil in the shape of a tree”.

Still today the views on qat greatly diverge. For some, qat farming is the perpetuum mobile of Yemen’s rural economy and qat chewing an age-old social pursuit that has helped to preserve Yemeni identity in a rapidly changing world. For others, qat is the main inhibitor of human and economic development in Yemen and is to blame for poverty and corruption, the depletion of Yemen’s water resources and the country’s sloppy approach to fighting Islamist terror.

While some believe that qat chewing was the very motor of Yemen’s “Arab Spring”, others hold it responsible for Yemen’s muddled revolution with its high blood toll. In internet blogs even al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and sympathizers discuss the pros and cons of the drug, and a number of Yemeni suicide bombers have met their fate with qat-filled cheeks. A final decision of al-Qaeda on what stance to adopt towards the drug has seemingly been postponed. The Jihadists want to avoid alienating Yemen’s population with a premature ban of the popular stimulant before having gained firm control over the country. Al-Qaeda has learned from the mistakes of its Islamist sister organization, the al-Shabab militia in war-torn Somalia.

With Yemen’s 2011 “Youth Revolution”, a decade of half-hearted qat policies and missed opportunities has come to an end – a decade, however, that has succeeded in lifting the veil of silence that was cast over qat in media and politics after President Ali Abdullah Salih came to power in 1978. This whitewash had been part of a ruling bargain between the Salih regime and the unruly tribes that had imparted highland Yemen several decades of relative stability and Salih a 33-year rule.

With the forecast depletion of Yemen’s oil and gas reserves within the next decade, the economic importance of qat will further increase and will bring about an important shift in the balance of power from the central government towards the qat producing highland tribes. The challenge of addressing the qat problem is thus tremendous for Yemen’s policy makers. While the transitional government is hesitant about its future qat course and anxious not to open a “war” on yet another front, Yemen’s anti-qat activists have seized the current, favorable climate of change. Emboldened by Yemen’s revolution and the ouster of President Salih they have recently launched a series of campaigns against the drug, dubbed a “revolution on one’s self”.

Free qat handouts secure a high voter turnout in Yemen’s elections.
Politics of Qat
The Role of a Drug in Ruling Yemen
Cover illustrations:
Front cover: A qāt merchant in the highland village of al-Jabīn in Rayma governorate.
Back cover: Free qāt handouts secured a high voter turnout in Yemen’s first direct presidential elections in 1999.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
**PROLOGUE**

Qāṭ (*Catha edulis* Forsk.) is a psychoactive stimulant that is grown in many of the highland areas of Eastern Africa, ranging from the southern Sudan through Ethiopia and Kenya to Madagascar and the Transvaal. It is also grown across the Red Sea in Yemen’s western highlands and in the ‘Asir and Jazān mountains of Saudi Arabia. While being considered a drug in most Arab states, as well as in many western countries, there is no viable legislation in Yemen today effectively controlling its cultivation, consumption or trade.

The hardy tree that is famed by farmers for its drought resistance, is grown according to official statistics on 12% of Yemen’s agricultural land, covering 153,500 hectares in 2009. A number of leading Yemeni researchers however believe that the actual figure may be double. In some of Yemen’s highland districts over 90% of farmers are involved in qāṭ agriculture, growing the drug on over 80% of the cultivated land. According to Yemen’s 2003 agricultural census 494,000 landholders grow qāṭ in the mountain areas. This is 43.6% of the country’s farmers and represents 3.9 million persons, considering average Yemeni farming family size of just below eight. Qāṭ accounts for 6% of the country’s GDP and for as much as one third of the agricultural GDP. It accounts for an average of 10% of the expenditures of Yemeni families, but qāṭ-related spending may reach nearly 40% in poor households. The qāṭ sector provides employment for one in every seven working Yemenis. In the capital Šanṭ’ā alone, some 13,000 persons are involved in the sale of the drug. On average 72% of Yemeni men and 33% of women above the age of 12 chew the bitter leaves of the qāṭ plant. Some 42% of male consumers chew five to seven days per week and display compulsive habits.

As the predominant cash crop and mainstay of the country’s rural economy, the income qāṭ generates prevents people in many of Yemen’s highland areas from drifting into the cities in order to seek work. The distribution network for qāṭ is undoubtedly the most advanced in the nation and few other economic sectors feature such a high level of organization. But qāṭ also depletes scarce water resources, contributes to soil degradation, and has crowded out production of essential food crops and agricultural exports. The area under qāṭ has expanded nearly 20-fold over the last four decades, displacing exportable coffee, fruits and vegetables, sorghum and wheat. Exports of cash crops such as coffee have been regressive while food imports have exploded due to the inroads made by qāṭ in the rural economy.

Qāṭ consumption and qāṭ-related expenditure also contribute to corruption, poverty, malnutrition and the disintegration of families. For its producers and consumers alike, qāṭ is seen as one of the main health hazards in Yemen, mainly due to the unregulated use of pesticides in its cultivation. Given the economic importance of qāṭ, it is not surprising that taxes stemming from the production and sale of the plant are substantial and constitute the main source of local revenue for many governorate and district administrations. The qāṭ sector contributes to government revenue in four ways, by a religious tithe levied on qāṭ production (zakāt), a public cleaning tax for keeping qāṭ markets tidy, and finally by a qāṭ consumption tax and a youth & sports tax, both levied on qāṭ sales. While zakāt is imposed as a direct tax and collected at farm level by zakāt assessors, the other taxes are levied as indirect taxes at military checkpoints on the roads leading into the cities and in qāṭ markets. The qāṭ consumption tax alone amounted to 3.4 billion Yemeni riyals in 2010 (US$ 16 million). Qāṭ is also smuggled across the mountains into Saudi Arabia where its consumption and trade are banned. This business is believed to award Yemen revenues of at least US$ 1 billion every year. The government has however no control over this illicit trade and it is believed that its proceeds help to finance the Ḥawthī insurgency in Yemen’s northern Ša’da province.

Colonial government’s in Aden and East Africa have issued repeated bans on qāṭ, to little avail. Also, the modernist revolutionary governments of North and South Yemen have since the late 1960s initiated a number of anti-qāṭ campaigns and even threatened to uproot the trees. With President ‘Ali ‘Abd Allāh Šāliḥ’s ascent to power in 1978 the qāṭ issue became a taboo and the crop disappeared...
from national statistics. At the same time, qat production by highland tribes was promoted by countless exemptions and subsidies that triggered an unprecedented mining of groundwater resources. A diesel subsidy made qat cultivation a highly profitable venture even in the desert-like eastern plateau and escarpment areas of Ṣan`ā’, Ḏawf and Mārib governorates. Here limited rainfall had so far set narrow boundaries to agriculture. It seems that the toleration and promotion of the drug was part of a power bargain between the Śāliḥ regime and the restive tribes that, after the political turmoil of the late 1970s, has imparted highland Yemen several decades of relative stability. It would be nearly 20 years until renewed efforts against the spread of the drug were made and before qat reappeared in Yemen’s statistical yearbooks upon pressure of the country’s international creditors.

The 1990 unification with socialist South Yemen, where strict qat regulations had been in place, did not impact the northern stance of qat. Southern laws were repealed and the northern mantle of secrecy regarding qat extended over the whole country. In the wake of the 1994 war of secession, tens of thousands of northern troops were stationed in every part of the former south. As most of these soldiers were confirmed qat chewers, the distribution networks for the drug have been extended even to remote desert watch posts and Bedouin settlements on the Saudi and Omani borders. Growing consumption of qat among the southern population has led over the past two decades to ever increasing financial transfers from this economically marginalized part of the country to the northern highlands.

Today, qat chewing is an integral part of life all across Yemen and a generally accepted habit in all strata of society. Even afternoon sessions in ministries or in the country’s consultative assembly are held in a setting of chewing. Also, Yemen’s political and economic elite has during the past decades developed a vested interest in qat. Many have invested in the qat sector since the returns generated by qat cultivation and trade are simply staggering. The highland tribes in whose territories the bulk of qat is produced have greatly profited from the laissez-faire approach of the government. Profits from the qat sector have enabled them to maintain their autonomy vis-à-vis the state and build up true tribal armies equipped even with heavy weaponry. Any reduction in qat production, let alone a ban of the crop or of its consumption would thus not only adversely affect the rural highland population, but is bound to arouse the resistance of the tribes and further destabilize the country making it perfectly ungovernable.

Factors constraining change in Yemen regarding qat are foremost the government’s fear of the tribes and of public unrest as well as the involvement of many members of the ruling class in qat farming. Paired with the inability of authorities to enforce legislation in the cities – not to mention the tribal areas – this makes policymakers reluctant to speak out openly against qat. This is exacerbated by a flagrant lack of alternative pastimes, the absence of other viable and profitable economic activities, and by the lack of markets for alternative high-value crops.

The second part of the 1980s saw the beginning of a transformation of the two Yemeni states from semi-rentiers heavily dependent on migrant remittances and unstable political rents into a politically unified oil rentier. Since then politics in Yemen have become tightly entangled with the windfalls from the oil sector and world market prices for oil. The revenues from the petroleum sector account for over 90% of Yemen’s export earnings and for around 70% of government revenue. They have enabled the regime in the second part of the 1990s and early 2000s to considerably enlarge its network of patronage and extend its power over many areas of the countryside. During this period qat politics has become more and more entangled with the revenue situation of the regime and has been employed increasingly as a means of rent-seeking during times of crisis. Despite the staunch resistance of qat farmers and tribes, the government has since 1999 repeatedly embarked on anti-qat campaigns with high audience appeal. These campaigns were often rather spontaneous and ill coordinated. Most of them were thus short-lived and laws enacted concerning qat were never really enforced (e.g. the 2002 law proscribing chewing in government facilities). These campaigns have effectuated no change in terms of cultivation and consumption of the drug, but have succeeded in earning Yemen’s policy makers the respect of their Arab counterparts and the benevolence of the donor community. Without compromising its grip on power, the regime has become the recipient of
increasing levels of development aid. Qät policy has handsomely paid off, not the least in the promise of admitting Yemen to the Gulf Cooperation Council by 2016.

Qät also played an important role during Yemen’s ‘Youth Revolution’ of 2011. Often believed to be a drug engendering complacency, lethargy and inaction, qät has helped to mobilize both the regime’s supporters and anti-Ṣāliḥ protestors: Supporters of the regime erected their tents on Tahrir Square and attempted to sit out the protests while chewing qät freely handed out by the regime. In ‘Change Square’ where the revolution was masterminded and where protestors had erected their tent city, a new visionary order for a post-Ṣāliḥ era was vividly discussed and elaborated while chewing qät.

As Yemen heads towards the post oil era – with some analysts predicting a depletion of oil reserves as early as 2017 – it will be interesting to observe what role qät and qät revenue will play in this future polity. Will the regime be able to capitalize on the qät sector? Will it succeed in tightening its grip on qät markets and in streamlining qät taxation to make up for lost revenue from oil? Or will the disintegrating network of patronage make the country perfectly ungovernable with qät producing tribes gaining yet more autonomy and qät becoming the true ruler of this society as it is in much of Somalia today?

Is Qät a Drug?

In Yemen qät is not considered as a drug by authorities and even car insurance policies explicitly cover accidents caused while chewing qät while driving (see annex 41). Qät may or may not be a drug in the clinical sense, thus a drug causing physical addiction. The leaves of the qät tree are certainly a social drug. Social life in most parts of Yemen circulates around qät today and many Yemenis believe there would not be any social life at all, were there not qät. Chewing the leaves creates delight, relaxes, and stimulates mutual understanding and companionship. It helps to create strong bonds between people and facilitates the mediation of Yemen’s many tribal troubles. Not a mere few believe they cannot get up, let alone work, without qät and thus start their day with chewing. Qät gives them strength of the body and strength of will. Chewing qät makes one forget despair and violence – be it just for a few hours – it makes one cope with the grievances of life and it gives hope in a country whose political and economic future looks so bleak. It makes one forget poverty and the hungry mouths to feed at home.

Yet many Yemenis – educated or not – would like to abstain from the use of the leaves from time to time, be it for financial, family or health reasons. But they feel compelled to chew by friends, neighbors or colleagues and fear exclusion from social circles and social life. Many fear the loss of respect, the loss of business opportunities, or simply the exclusion from information circulating in qät chews. Over the years, I have observed how the chewing habit has proliferated in the Ḥadramawt and on the island of Socotra (areas that I first visited in 1993); how it took hold of the coastal population and then slowly crept up the wādis to the herders of the highlands, how it spread from soldiers to fishermen, from traders to farmers, from adults to adolescents, and finally from husbands to wives. I watched a defenseless and desperate population – local councillors, shaykhs, fathers and spouses – fighting its spread with all means at hand. Without success. I watched how qät ravaged these regions’ unique culture and how it changed social customs and society, how traditional leisure pursuits disappeared and how values and ethics have become diluted.

I have known Yemen for almost twenty years, took part in innumerable qät chews and interviewed several thousands of people on the qät issue. For me, the leaves of the qät tree are not a narcotic drug. However, I hold the firm belief that they are much more than the “mild social stimulant” to which literature so often refers. They are potent social drug, holding Yemen and Yemeni life firmly in its grip. They create a mental form of addiction that makes the plant as ravaging and certainly as dangerous as any narcotic drug.
Approach of the Study

The literature on the habit of qât chewing, its social role and the impact of qât use on health is quite impressive. This book does not attempt to duplicate this and is focusing on the role of qât in the politics of modern Yemen and of the wider region – a topic that has so far been entirely ignored. The review of qât policies and economic events during the past decades will show how successive Yemeni governments have apprehended and used qât increasingly as an instrument of politics. It will show that government action regarding the drug is less driven by a genuine desire for reform or by the interest of ridding Yemeni society of a social evil, but much rather by the need for mobilizing financial resources and by a desire for societal control and political stability. Qât politics – the study suggests – has above all become part of a comprehensive strategy of rent-seeking, employed by the ruling elite in times of revenue crisis in order to uphold the state’s monopoly of power and maintain its widespread network of patronage. Qât politics is since the late 1970s part of a ruling bargain between the regime and the tribes, explaining the tolerant and often supportive stance of government towards the drug.

After a brief overview of the history and development of qât consumption in Yemen as well as on the extent of the habit and its detrimental effects on health, both in chapter I, in chapter II the metamorphosis of Yemen during the 1970s from an agrarian into a semi-rentier state is documented, as well as its transformation from a country depending largely on worker remittances and political rents into an oil economy. The book then analyzes qât politics in a regional retrospect (chapter III). This includes the struggle of colonial administrations against qât in Yemen and Eastern Africa, the role of qât during the reign of Yemen’s last Imam and the position of the League of Arab States vis-à-vis the drug. Here also the fruitless efforts of the Saudi Arabian government and of Saudi religious scholars against the crop are presented and an analysis of qât politics in post-colonial Somalia given, where the drug has become one of the factors fueling the prolonged civil war. In chapter IV, the approach to qât of Yemen’s revolutionary governments in both South and North Yemen is described, whereupon in chapter V changes in qât politics and the in development of qât farming during the first two decades of the Şāliḥ regime are given a closer look. Chapter VI documents in great detail, how qât has become an instrument of rent-seeking in times of financial and political crisis.

In chapter VII, the ups and downs of qât politics following Yemen’s First National Conference on Qât are described and the qât activism of the country’s ruling class documented following the Gulf Cooperation Council’s expression of intent to admit Yemen to the organization if it combats corruption, weapons and qât. Here also interviews with a number of high-ranking Yemeni policymakers on the subject of qât are echoed.

In chapter VIII, the role qât plays for political stability, political control and for identity in a fragile state is analyzed. This chapter also reviews the role of qât in the Ş’a’da war and in terrorism, in spreading northern hegemony over former South Yemen, and it discusses the role of qât in Yemen’s 2011 ‘Youth Revolution’. Further, the effects of qât on corruption and the importance of qât revenue for Yemen’s decentralization process are examined. Also, the difficult task of civil society organizations and of religious communities fighting qât is documented.

Finally, in chapter IX, conclusions are presented and an outlook for a Yemen after the conclusion of the oil era is given.

Peer Gatter, Frankfurt am Main, June 2012

www.qat-yemen.com